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Performers act as a catalyst to communicate the relevant original content in a work. This article seeks to discuss two 
contentious questions with regard to the interpretation of Performers Rights provided under Section 38 and 39 of the Indian 
Copyright Act, specifically with respect to Singers’ Rights, and offers contrary opinions to the prevailing interpretations in 
the industry as well as one’s argued and accepted by the Delhi High Court. After analysing various doctrinal principles 
surrounding interpretation of statutes in India, this article firstly concludes that Section 39A of the Indian Copyright Act, and 
the royalty scheme therein, is applicable with a “Retroactive” effect in India; and secondly that every performance rendered 
in real time, irrespective of it being in front of an audience, on a stage, or in the studio, ought to be covered under the 
definition of a Performance under Section 2(q) read with Section 38 of the Indian Copyright Act, to effectively provide for 
Performers Rights, encapsulated within the Indian legislative schema. This article also attempts to harmonize these 
interpretations with a comparative as well as an international IP perspective. 
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Performers rights were introduced in the Indian 
Copyright Act under Section 38, by an amendment to 
the Act in 1994.
1
 These rights are explicitly provided 
to Performers, (qualifying under Section 2(qq)), 
including singers
2
 delivering a performance i.e., an 
acoustic or visual presentation made live.
3 
Performers 
rights are completely independent of ownership of 
‘works’ and are categorized as related rights, protecting 
interests of those who contribute to making works 
available to the public.  
In order to understand what the law really is, it is 
essential to know the “why” and “how” of the law. Why 
the law is what it is and how it came to its present form.
4 
The main reason for bringing in this amendment, was 
to harmonize the Indian Act with the provision of 
the Rome Convention for Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations.
5
 While 
bringing this amendment, a further important intentional 
feature was that “this right will benefit performers…”.
5
 
The creative intervention of such performers is deemed 
to be necessary to give life to musical, dramatic 
and choreographic works and to facilitate their 
communication to the public. Performers act as a 
catalyst to communicate the relevant original content in 
a work and it has been considered justified to recognise 
the existence of performers rights due to the 
involvement of skill, creativity and merit, in such 
transmission.
6
 Apart from the same, the consequentialist 
utilitarian bend of Anglo-Saxon Copyright Principles, as 
followed by India, recognises the theory of copyrights as 
incentives for more production of expressions and 
original works. The end goal of having such a policy 
present, statutorily, is to ensure more works come into 
existence. The reason for recognising such neighbouring 
rights is to ensure that transmitters, who allow for 
creative works to be communicated to the public, are 
also incentivised to exist. The purpose of copyright 
and related rights is to foster a creative expressive 
environment where the public is exposed to more 
expressions and perspectives. In lieu of the same, 
incentives, if considered to be essential, for the same 
policy to be fulfilled, for authors, also hold extreme 
relevance in the context of performers as well, for the 
end goal of such a policy to be fulfilled.  
Theoretical Interpretation of Performers Rights 
Internationally, scholars have adopted a wide 
definition of a Performance connoting it to be a 
transitory activity of a human individual that can be 
perceived and is intended as a form of communication 
to others for the purpose of entertainment, education 
or ritual.
7
 The core of this definition revolves around 
the concept of a performance being a mode of 
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communication to the public, by itself or with the aid 
of technology.
8
 Hence the performance in itself is not 
a subject of copyright, but rather is a mode of 
communication to the public and involves skills to 
transit and provide reception to expressions. This skill 
is what is sought to be incentivised under the act, as  
a related right. Performances by singers enable 
conversion of written melodic scripts or an expression 
conceived by the composers into audible and 
receptive musical elements, to communicate the 
expression to the public. It involves substantial 
investment in learning this art of communication and 
varies from performer to performer with respect to the 
effectiveness of communication. Therefore, in order 
to incentivise them to exist, by according protection 
against unpaid reproductions, as is done in the case of 
author-creators, such performers rights are provided 
in the statutory framework. These rights did not exist 
in any jurisdiction around the world until the advent 
of the Musical Performers Protection Act, 1925 in the 
United Kingdom. The reasoning for the sudden debate 
on the existence of performers rights in the last three 
decades or so seems to be influenced by the advent of 
phonogram technology which enables commercial 
exploitation of these performances through the 
“Record-Upload-Download” mechanism. Unauthorized 
exploitation denies the performer of the economic 
benefit that would have arisen by virtue of the 
performance on the event of it being an authorized use 
and the reward for such an act of performance. It may 
not seem that performers require such economic 
incentives to continue performing, however the 
intention behind the same is to ensure that if there are 
performers who actually require such monetary 
incentives, in terms of needs of survival and 
sustenance in a capitalist society, which is the status 
quo, they are provided for the same, to ensure that 
they do not seize to practice and continue to exist, 
irrespective of privilege.
9
 Of course this incentive 
needs to be balanced with access problems ,and such 
incentives cannot exist at the cost of access of works 
to the public, however a rightful balance needs  
to be drawn, which does not take away reasonable 
prospects of performers from existing in the society. 
This theory and reasoning is further supported by the 
Lockean Concept of “Just Desserts” and the labour 
theory which seems more relevant in the case of 
performers rights rather than copyrights
10
 and has also 
been acknowledged in the fundamental precedent of 
Sayre v Moore.
11
 This precedent seems especially 
relevant in a capitalist society, wherein by virtue of 
marginal opportunities to earn better existing, the 
existence of performers, without due compensation is 
questionable, at least theoretically. It is imperative to 
realise that it is the performer, and specifically the 
singer, whose transitive form of expression creates a 
lofty expression and leaves a permanent and enriching 
imprint of the work on the listener’s mind, and 
without which, the copyrighted work is bereft of 
existence and circulation. Performances have 
historically been culturally devalued in Copyright 
Law wherein the body-work and physical labour of 
creating a performance is discounted against the 
creative labour of conceptualising a work, even 
though it may be a product of as much preparation 
and calculation, as a musical script.
12
 Further, the fact 
that a singer, who is a subset of a performer, faces a 
range of creative choices when deciding how to 
perform a piece of music, which can substantially be 
fixed in a tangible medium, by virtue of a phonogram, 
needs to be accounted for economically in law by 
providing a beneficial construction of a statutory 
provision providing for performers rights. It is a 
relationship based on co-dependence that a musician 
and a performer share, which is accounted for by 
providing for such performer’s rights. Hence these 
rights are to be interpreted in the most beneficial 
manner in favour of the performers, along with a 
rightful balance with the question of access. 
Internationally, although musical works and 
performances have been argued to be mutually 
exclusive,
13
 this argument only applies towards the 
factum of performance being a mode of communication 
to the public and the musical work being the subject 
matter of copyright. Every musical performance 
embodies music within itself and hence a singer who 
performs music must be accorded performers rights, 
irrespective of their contribution to the music in itself, to 
economically provide for the labour involved in a 
“performance” or the act of communicating the musical 
content, in a primarily capitalistic jurisdiction like India.  
 
Contentious Issues in the Scheme of Performers 
Rights in India 
This article seeks to discuss the following two 
contentious questions with regard to the interpretation 
of Performers Rights provided under Section 38 of the 
Indian Copyright Act, specifically with respect to 
Singer’s Rights: 
(1) Whether Section 39A of the Indian Copyright 
Act, providing for the application of Section 18 and 
19 to performers as well (inalienable right to receive 




royalty) in case of assignment, use and broadcasting 
of the qualifying performances for commercial uses, 
is applicable with a prospective or a retroactive/ 
retrospective effect? 
(2) Whether Performers Rights are available for 
performances taking place in the studio as well, or 
only those conducted before an audience and in a 
concert- like setting? What is the meaning of “live” 
under Section 2(q) of the Copyright Act? 
There is pending litigation
14
 as well as contrary 
judgments
15
 on these questions in India, reflecting a 
“humpty-dumpty” jurisprudence.  
 
Retroactive or Limited Retrospective Application of 
Performers Rights 
The legislature, through the 2012 amendments to 
the Copyright Act, furthered a pro-active change 
towards beneficial protection of performers, wherein 
Section 39A was introduced. This Section extends the 
application of Sections 18 and 19
16
 to performances 
and performers rights, with necessary adaptations and 
modifications.
17
 Section 18 and 19 of the Copyright 
Act provide for “Assignment of Copyright” and the 
inalienable equitable right to royalty of the authors 
with the assignee upon exploitation of the work.
18
 The 
extension of the same to performances and performers 
implies an inalienable right to royalty for the 
performers on the event of exploitation, assignment 
and broadcasting of their performances. The question 
for litigation before the Delhi High Court,
16 
concerns 
as to whether this inalienable provision of royalties 
extends to performances which have taken place  
prior to 2012 as well. It is clear that no complete 
retrospective application can be suggested due to the 
unimaginable number of claims from prior to 2012 
which would come up for litigation, including the 
royalty claims thereto,
19
 however this question 
concerns with acts of unauthorized reproduction of 
performances recorded prior to 2012 (performances 
that took place prior to the amendment), although 
reproduced or broadcasted post the amendment.  
This issue was also debated and argued by Javed 
Akhtar, in the Parliamentary debates concerning the 





Intention of the Legislature 
To ascertain the true historic intent and inducement 
of the legislature while bringing in a statutory 
provision, the Statement of Objects and Reasons are 
considered to be a valuable and effective tool, 
although not conclusive due to the debates before the 
bill is passed.
21
 The Statement of Objects and Reasons 
of the 2010 Copyright Amendment Bill (which went 
on to be passed as the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 
2012), primarily states one of the purposes of this 
amendment to be conformity and concurrence (to the 
extent necessary) with the international standards of 
Performer’s protection as specified by the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation in the WIPO 
Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).
22 
Further, 
recent formal accession to this treaty by the 




The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
1996,
24
 in its Preamble, states the intention of this 
international agreement to be to develop and maintain 
the protection of the rights of performers and 
producers of phonograms in an effective and uniform 
manner. Article 3 of this treaty, under sub-section 1, 
states that the contracting parties shall accord 
protection provided under this Treaty to performers 
and phonograms establishing an obligation upon 
accession.
25
 Further, Article 15 of this treaty provides 
for the Right to Remuneration for Broadcasting and 
Communication to the Public which states under  
sub section (1) that Performers and producers of 
Phonograms shall enjoy the right to a single equitable 
remuneration for direct or indirect use of phonograms 
for commercial broadcasting or communication of 
such performances to the public.
26
 This is in 
correspondence to Section 39 A read with Section 18 
(proviso 3 and 4) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.  
Importantly, Article 17 of the WPPT states in its 
sub-section (1) that the term of protection to be 
granted to performers shall last at least until the end 
of 50 years from the end of the year in which  
the performance was fixed in a phonogram.
27 
This 
clearly denotes that there is an intention to include 
performances taking place even prior to the treaty as 
long as the cause of action (broadcasting) is within 50 
years from the origin of the performance and after the 
enaction of this treaty. An analogous provision can be 
found even in the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 under 
Section 38 (2) which also seems to include all 




Further, the Statement of Objects and reasons also 
states the clarification and beneficial intention of the 
Amending Act with regard to the provision of 
royalties to authors of literary and musical works and 
performers (by virtue of Section 39 A and the 
applicability of similar provisions pertaining to 




royalties in the case of performers as well) through the 
copyright societies.
29
 The Amending Act states its object 
to be the acknowledgment and adequate economic as 
well as moral incentives through compensation for 
performers and their socio-economic welfare as a class, 




What is Retroactive or Limited-Retrospective Construction? 
The word retroactive has been defined as 
“extending in scope or effect (of a statute, ruling etc.) 
to matters that have occurred in the past, also termed 
retrospective.”
31 
The Indian Supreme Court has, 
however, gone on to slightly differentiate between the 
concept of retroactive and retrospective by construing 
retroactive to be a subset of the retrospective The 
Court has stated
32
 that retrospective means looking 
backward and contemplating what is part or having 
reference to acts or facts occurring before the act 
came into place.
33
 Retroactive, on the other hand, 
refers to creation of new obligations and duties upon 
transactions or considerations already having taken 
place in the past, upon performance of a particular 
new cause of action.
33
 
In the case of a beneficial legislation like the one in 
our case, the purpose of the new rule would be 
defeated if it accounted for only those agreements that 
were entered post the enactment of the rule.
34
 In an 
instance concerning the SARFAESI Act, the Supreme 
Court had held that “In case of retroactivity, 
Parliament takes note of the existing conditions and 




The basic point is that in a statute involving a 
retroactive construction, the cause of action or 
incidence of liability arises post the enactment/ 
amendment of the statute (as opposed to a completely 
retrospective construction), however it takes into 
account and includes the extended class of people 
affected or transactions entered into even prior to the 
enactment/amendment. Hence it insinuates the 
principle of limited retrospectively benefitting and  
not discriminating against two people- one who 
completed the transaction prior to the act as well as 
one who has completed the transaction post the act, as 
long as the cause of action takes place post the 
statutory stipulation.  
This construction is relevant in the context 
performers in order to provide for the payment of 
royalties for performances that have taken place prior 
to the amendment as well as post the amendment, 
provided that the reproduction or broadcasting 
(incidence of liability) has taken place post 2012. 
There seems no reason to not provide for royalties to 
singers whose labour was recorded and fixed prior to 
the amendment and continues to be played and 
exploited for commercial uses. Making a distinction 
and providing for a prospective enaction of the statute 
will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of 
India i.e. Right to equal and fair treatment of equals 
and similarly placed members of the society in law,
36
 
as these performances are being excluded from  
the purview of royalty payments upon no basis 
whatsoever and continue to be exploited, rendering 
stipulated incentives to be arbitrary. 
 
Why Retroactive? The Case for Beneficial Construction 
While interpreting a statute, the inhibition against 
Retrospective or Retroactive construction is not an 
unalterable rule and varies secundum materium.
37
 
Courts in India have repeatedly established that this 
universal assumption of prospective construction of a 
statute is applicable with low insistence in cases 
involving welfare legislations or a remedial statute.
38 
The presumption against retrospective enaction can be 
done away with due to necessary implication. This 
necessity is implied when the object of the statute is 
to cure an acknowledged evil and provide for a 
remedy in lieu of mischief or denial of a certain right 
to a community or a class of individuals as a whole, 
or the lack of an equitable treatment thereto.
39
 The 
courts in India have held that if an amending act has a 
beneficial provision providing for compensation 
which accrues by virtue of a prevalent mischief or 
exploitation or uncompensated labour, it shall be 
interpreted with a retrospective or retroactive effect as 
is practically feasible, providing compensation to all 
beneficiaries.
40
 Further, a statute which provides for 
imperative benefits to a class or certain similarly 
placed people must be read in consonance to expand 
the effect of such benefit to all intended beneficiaries, 
irrespective of the date of them attaining the status of 
a beneficiary. In such situations, unless the statute 
specifically provides for no retrospective/retroactive 
construction, it cannot be implied.
41
 
Further, in case of a statute being brought into 
effect in order to comply with international standards 
or due to experience gathered by the parliament 
realising a need to further provide certain imperative 
rights and incentives, an application with retroactive 
effect, covering beneficiaries who entered into 
transactions pre-amendment, which continue to be 
exploited as well, is highly recommended.
42
 




While interpreting Section 39A of the Copyright 
Act or Clause 28 of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 
2012, the intent of the legislation is to provide for a 
right to compensation to the performers on the event 
of broadcasting or communication to public, in the 
form of royalties, to incentivise the specialised skill 
and labour involved in the performance. Before  
this amendment, there has been no such provision  
of royalties or any form of compensation for the 
labour induced by the performers.
12 
This beneficial 
amendment to the Copyright Act was introduced in 
order to avoid a deprivation of the merit, labour and 
creative choice employed by these performers in a 
performance. Therefore, in light of the beneficial 
construction of this statute providing for the welfare 
and economic benefit of performers and to conform 
with the principal policies laid down by the WPPT, 
Section 39A of the statute must apply retroactively 
and cover performances which came into existence 
prior to the amendment (2012) as well. Even the 1994 
amendment to the Copyright Act, which within its 
purview, introduced this concept of Performers Rights 
in India, provides in its statement of object and 
reasons that this amendment to the act is for the 




Analysing the International Position 
The UK High Court has acknowledged the 
retrospective application of Performers Rights to the 
extent of including performances, which took place 
before its enaction, within its purview, in a decision 
that states that performances that took place decades 
before the enaction of the legislation are also covered 
and an act of broadcast or reproduction post enactment 
would result in accrual of royalties to the performers.
43
 
Further, importantly, as a policy benchmark, the UK 
CDPA within itself expressly states the inclusion of 
all performances within the purview of performers 
rights, irrespective of them coming into place before 





 as well recognises this 
position and such a construction has also been 
advocated by the Ministry of Economic Development 
of New Zealand
46 
with respect to its national statute 
concerning performers rights.  
As far as the United States is concerned, the Music 
Modernization Act, 2018, has under its Title-2 
mandated the provision of royalties for performances 
and recordings which took place before the enactment 
of the Copyright Act as well. The legislation 
stipulated this beneficial intention.
47
 The Title 
providing for the same has appropriately been named 
as the “Compensating Legacy Artists for their Songs, 
Service and Important Contributions to the Society or 
CLASSICS Act, upon extensive lobbying by pre-1972 
artists and performers.
48 
In light of this, it is essential 
for the Indian Judiciary to take into account this 
policy consideration while interpreting the 2012 
Amendment Act. 
 
Broad Construction of a “Live Performance” in the Copyright 
Act 
The definition of a “Performance” under Section 
2(q) of the Copyright Act,
3
 specifically includes the 
requirement for the act to be “live”. Further, 
statutorily, explanation 3 of Rule 68 in the Copyright 
Rules, which is a delegated legislation enacted by the 
Central Government, provides that the definition of 




The Debate Around the Interpretation of “Live” 
There has been a debate around the meaning of 
Section 2(q) of the Indian Copyright Act and the term 
“live” in the Indian Courts, yielding contrary 
judgments and per-incuriam usage of a High Court 
precedent by a Lower Court.
17 
The argument against 
Rule 68 is that the explanation was brought in post the 
2012 amendment through an executive clarification, 
and seeks to bring unplugged performances, plays and 
interviews which are generally conducted in the 
studio under the purview of “live”. Extending the 
same to all studio performances including those of 
songs which are recorded and then produced and 
presented in a sound recording or a visual format has 
been vehemently opposed by record labels.
50
 In the 
case of Sushila v Hungama Digital Media Private 
Ltd., the Delhi District Court at Patiala House,  
has restricted the meaning of live to only those 
performances made before an audience or in a 
concerted atmosphere, be it in a studio or otherwise.
51
 
It has followed the strict literal rule of construction 
relying on tools like the Oxford Dictionary.  
Such a narrow construction is without any 
application of mind has been rightly rejected by the 
Delhi High Court in the case of Neha Bhasin v Anand 
Raj Anand
52
, as it goes against the purposive nature of 
Performers Rights and the rights exist in the first 
place.
10
 It also is extremely arbitrarily when viewed 
from the point of such rights to be incentive. The 
author often wonders – why would the legislature 
want these performers to be incentivised to perform 
on stage and not in a studio? What can be the reason 
for such a difference in thought? The author can’t 




think of any, and it is a completely arbitrary 
interpretation when looked at from the perspective of 
why these rights exist as a tool to incentivise more 
performances. Performers, including singers, through 
a performance, irrespective of directly before an 
audience or through a recorded medium, act as a 
catalyst to transmit the musical/dramatic/literary 
content from the composer or the author to the 
perceiver or the audience.
6
 This transmission involves 
an element of ingenuity, labour, judgment and skill, 
and there is a need to economically incentivise the 
same for the society to experience more expressions 
in a consequentialist sense especially in a capitalist 
society.
11
 Even in a song performed in a studio, there 
is this element of labour involved on the part of the 
performer, although the performance may be edited 
prior to being communicated to the audience. This in 
no way implies for a differential treatment denying 
these artists any incentives.  
The Delhi High Court in the case of Neha Bhasin, 
has rightly stated that every performance has to be 
live in the first instance, irrespective of it being before 
an audience or in a studio.
52
 The Court further stated 
that irrespective of the forum involved, once the 
instance of the performance takes place, certain 
amount of skill and labour is inputted which requires 
ingenuity and judgment, and hence must be protected, 
for incentives to be ensured.
52 
The intention of 
bringing in the word “live” in the definition of the 
“Performance” through the 1994 amendment to the 
Copyright Act seems to be avoid inclusion of acts 
solely developed by the use of technology and 
computer without any body-work or labour. Even a 
performance in a studio by a singer, is first performed 
and sang (inducing labour and creative acumen), 
which is recorded and worked upon.  
The Court in the case of Sushila has denied the 
application of the reasoning in Neha Bhasin and has 
passed a per-incuriam decision relying upon the 
Division Bench judgment in the case of IPRS v Aditya 
Pandey wherein it was stated that, “Performers Rights 
introduced by the 1994 amendment, required a 
division of the subject pertaining to live performances 
while communicating the work to the public and when 
communication was by way of diffusion
53,
 hence 
interpreting the intention of the legislature to 
segregate such performances as “live”. There are two 
problems with the reliance on this judgment and this 
particular interpretation.  
Firstly, this was an assertive argument by IPRS in 
this case and was not a question of dispute which the 
court has delved or pronounced upon. Secondly, even 
if there is a difference in communicating live to the 
public and by the act of diffusion, the act of 
communication by diffusion does not preclude 
protection for a performance which is firstly recorded 
and then diffused. There has been a performance, 
which is perceived by the audience due to the act of 
diffusion and must be accounted for when according 
incentives. The performance of the musical content 
took place in the instance and thereafter was 
communicated by the medium of diffusion. The 
difference in the “communication to the public” by 
diffusion or display as mentioned in Section 2(ff), in 
no way is to affect the definition of a performance and 
the ambit of a “live” performance under Section 2(q). 
Such a distinction in a performance shall be baseless, 
as both an input of skill and labour which is either 
communicated to the public by diffusion or direct 
display. It is to be noted herein that the creative 
intervention of performers is deemed necessary to 
give life to musical, dramatic and choreographic 
works and to facilitate communication to the public 
and this catalytic role and investment must be 
incentivised for the existence of more and diverse 
expressions.  
 
Purposive Interpretation of the Provision 
The strict literal interpretation of “live” by the 
Court in the case of Sushila goes against the principle 
of purposive construction of a statute. It has been 
recognised by the Supreme Court of India that “The 
words of a statute, when there is a doubt about the 
meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which 
they best harmonise with the subject and object of the 
enactment. Their meaning is found not so much in a 
strict grammatical or etymological propriety of 
language, nor even in its popular use, as in the object 
to be attained or the subject on the occasion of which 
they are used.”
54
 When two interpretations are 
possible, one which advances the remedy and the 
object envisioned by the legislature in the most 
efficient way must be preferred, to avoid the 
legislative futility and vagueness.
55
 
In the statute at hand, the purpose behind enaction as 
has been established in the initial part of the article is to 
provide for an imperative socio-economic benefit to all 
performers who expend skill and labour in transmitting 
content to be perceived by the audience.
56 
Therefore, this 
statute must be construed purposively to give effect to 
the rights of all performers who contribute the requisite 
skill and labour in a performance.  




Various restaurants and music venues gain 
immense commercial benefit and have a huge 
customer base because of the kind of music which 
they play. This results in direct commercial benefit to 
these venues due to the skill and labour invested by 
the singers and performers of the musical work used, 
who are accorded no benefit for the usage and 
broadcast of their performance. This is an absurd 
construction and goes against the primary object of 
performers rights, as there is no justifiable reason to 
discriminate between those performances in the studio 
and on a stage setting, while according incentives. 
The Supreme Court of India has further held in 
principle that the court while interpreting a statute 
must hold the construction which is just, reasonable 
and sensible
57
and least offensive to the sense of 
justice.
58
 Justice Venkatrama Aiyar has further 
established the sound legal principle of statutory 
interpretation stating, “Where the language, meaning 
and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest 
contradiction of the apparent purpose of the 
enactment, or to some absurdity, presumably not 
intended and unjustifiable, a construction maybe put 
upon it which modifies the meaning of the words or 
expands or limits it, as suitable…”
59
 
Ergo, to avoid the absurdity and the unjustifiable 
anomaly which the narrow definition of the word “live” 
purports, it is imperative that this provision should be 
purposively interpreted to include all performances 
taking place in the instance, irrespective of it being  
in a studio or before an audience, providing for a  
broad meaning of “live”. Further, such a purposive 
construction of a statutory provision has often been 
employed by courts internationally, while interpreting 
provisions passed to implement international agreements 





The International Position 
Justice Richard Arnold has argued that providing a 
narrow and limited definition of live, restricted to 
performances before an audience, will result in 
denying performers rights to a lot of performers 
including film actors who essentially perform before 
the camera itself, and would result in a chilling effect 
on these rights.
61 
The definition of live can only  
be restricted to not include such performances  
which have parts of a pre-recorded song in a new 
performance (mashups or remixes) or if the 




Additionally, a limited interpretation of “Live” 
would reverse the Queen’s bench decision in the case 
of Rickless v United Artist Corps.
62
 where essentially 
the performances in question were that on a film and 
not on a stage before an audience. Yet the Court went 
ahead and provided for performers rights to all the 
performers. Even specific to the case of a performance 
in a studio, such a limited interpretation of a live 
performance has not been indulged in by the courts.
63
 
Hence every performance rendered in real time, 
irrespective of it being in front of an audience, on a 
stage, or in the studio, ought to be covered under the 
definition of a Performance under Section 2(q) to 
effectively provide for Performers Rights and the 
right to royalty to singers upon exploitation of their 
performances by virtue of electronic diffusion as well 
as direct display. 
 
Conclusion 
In the backdrop of this theoretical discussion 
surrounding the interpretation of Section 39A and 
Section 2(q) of the Copyright Act, and their intended 
meaning with light to the international practice,  
the utilitarian cum-personhood bent of the Indian 
position on copyright, the author, through this article, 
conclusively argues that it is the most prudent that: 
(1) Section 39A of the Indian Copyright Act, be 
given a retroactive effect, to accommodate the 
performances that took before the amendment to the 
provisions of this act and, 
(2) The definition of a live performance be 
construed to be broad enough to include all 
performances which were rendered in real time, 
inspite of them being before an audience or not. This 
is a departure from the literal interpretation of the 
provisions, but rather towards the progressive contextual 
and harmonious construction of the provisions of the 
Indian Copyright Act. 
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